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1 Introduction
Most countries have social security programs to help provide retirees with financial security.
However, these programs are experiencing enormous pressure to remain solvent and viable.
For example, the OECD (2019) notes that “...pressure persists to maintain adequate and
financially sustainable levels of pensions as population aging is accelerating in most OECD
countries.” At the same time, too many people do not have enough retirement savings.
Policymakers have proposed several fiscal measures to improve these programs, but there is
a growing belief that it is fruitful to also use a competitive, market-based system, to provide
better retirement products, e.g., annuities, (Feldstein, 2005; Mitchell and Shea, 2016).
Despite this, there is little empirical research about how a market for annuities works,
or how the demand and strategic supply interact to determine equilibrium pensions and
retirees’ welfare. In this paper, we answer these questions in the context of the annuities
market in Chile where firms have private information about their annuitization costs and
they compete in multi-stage multi-attribute auctions for savings of risk-averse retirees with
different mortality risks and preferences. An annuity is an ideal retirement product because
it insures against longevity risk (Yaari, 1965; Brown et al., 2001; Davidoff, Brown, and
Diamond, 2005), so a better understanding of an annuity market can help many retirees.
For instance, retirement income in Chile is considered low: The median replacement rate
(ratio of pension to the last wage) is 44%, whereas the International Labor Organization
recommends 70%. According to the antitrust authority (Quiroz et al., 2018) pensions are
low because Chile uses complex multi-stage bidding mechanism, and retirees have poor
understanding of the role of firms’ risk ratings (AA+ vs. AA), which soften competition.
There is a proposal in Chile to use English auctions and prohibit the use of risk ratings.
Using our model estimates and counterfactuals we evaluate the effect of this proposal on
pensions and retirees’ welfare. We find that these changes lead to an insignificant increase in
pensions except for those with high savings. The estimates of the cost distributions suggest
that the current system is competitive when it comes to retirees with savings that is less
than 60% across all retirees, and for the rest 40%, firms are more likely to have lower costs.
So, using English auctions improves pensions only for the high savers.
These and our other estimates of bequest preferences and welfare can be useful for coun-
tries that have adopted the “Chilean model” or are considering private a market for annu-
ities. For example, the SECURE Act of 2019 incentivizes businesses and communities in
the United States to band together to offer annuities but is silent about “designing” such a
market.
Chile provides an ideal setting to study and evaluate a market for annuity contracts. It
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is one of the first countries in the world to adopt a market-based system for annuities. In
1981, Chile replaced its public pay-as-you-go pension system with a new system of privately
managed individual accounts. Moreover, since 2004, all retirees use a centralized exchange
(known as SCOMP) to choose between an annuity, from among those offered by insurance
companies, or a programmed withdrawal option, which is a default “self-insurance” product.
SCOMP provides access to high-quality administrative data that span more than a
decade. We observe everything about retirees that firms observe before they make their
participation decisions. In particular, for each retiree, we observe her demographic informa-
tion, savings, names of the participating firms and their offers for different types of annuities
(e.g., immediate annuity, an annuity with ten years of guaranteed payments), her final choice,
and her date of death, whenever applicable. All annuities are fixed and standardized.
We propose a flexible but tractable model of demand and imperfectly competitive supply
for annuities to capture the key market-features.1 There are at least four main components
of a retiree’s demand for annuity: Her savings, mortality risk, preferences for bequest and
firms’ risk ratings, and the monthly pensions.2 So, we model each retiree as an “auctioneer”
who chooses a firm and an annuity that gives her the highest expected present discounted
utility.3 To determine each pension’s expected present discounted utility, we follow the
extant literature and assume that the preferences are homothetic with constant relative risk
aversion utility, and retirees’ mortality follows a Gompertz distribution.
In Chile, there is uncertainty about the role of firms’ savings quintile in retirees’ deci-
sions. To capture this uncertainty, we assume that retirees are rationally inattentive decision
makers, and do not know their preferences for risk ratings. However, they learn about their
preferences in the first stage by processing some costly information. We use the discrete
choice framework in Matëjka and McKay (2015) to model the first stage’s decision process.
In the second stage, we assume that retirees know their preferences.
On the supply side, we assume that life insurance companies observe everything about the
retirees. They know their annuitization costs before participating in a retiree auction.The
per-dollar annuitization cost is also known as the Unitary Necessary Capital (UNC), and it
captures the cost of making a survival-contingent stream of payments. In particular, UNC
is the expected amount of dollars required to finance a stream of payments of one dollar
until the retiree’s death and any proportional obligations to her surviving relatives if any.
1Berstein (2010); Alcalde and Vial (2016, 2017); Morales and Larráın (2017); Fajnzylber and Willington
(2019) and Illanes and Padi (2019) also use data from Chile. However, they focus on demand (retirees) and
we consider both sides of the market.
2Bequest preference affects demand for annuities (Kopczuk and Lupton, 2007; Lockwood, 2018; Illanes
and Padi, 2019; Einav, Finkelstein, and Schrimpf, 2010), but we let its distribution to have a “mass-at-zero.”
3Similar considerations arise when U.S. states bid for firms (Slattery, 2019), and in Internet service
markets (Krasnokutskaya, Song, and Tang, 2020), where the “winner” is not necessarily the highest bidder.
3
For example, if the UNC of a firm is $200, it means that the firm’s expected cost to provide
a pension of $100 is $20,000. Participating firms bid simultaneously on all of the annuity
products that the retiree is interested in. If the retiree chooses from the first round, then
the game ends, or else she bargains with the participating firms, where she has imperfect
information about firms’ annuitization costs and what they can offer.
We establish the identification of our crucial model parameters by relying on the exoge-
nous variation in retirees’ demographics, savings, and market interest rates. Intuitively, as
demographics and interest rates vary, they affect firms’ costs directly (via returns on in-
vestment) and indirectly (via mortalities), affecting firms’ participation decisions and their
offers. For instance, all else equal, a retiree with stronger bequest preferences is more likely
to choose annuities with a larger present expected value of bequests, and vice versa.4 To
identify preferences for firms’ risk ratings and the conditional distributions of annuitization
costs, we use only the second-stage data. We can express the chosen pension as a sum of the
difference in utility from the two most competitive firms’ risk ratings and the losing firm’s
annuitization costs. These two competitive firms’ identities vary with retirees and with them
the differences in risk ratings and the cost for the losing firm, which allow us to apply the
identification strategies from random coefficient models and English auctions to our setting.5
Our estimates suggest that those who have higher savings have lower information pro-
cessing costs. This result is consistent because those with more considerable savings tend
to be more educated and possibly have better financial literacy. Interestingly, we find that
those who use sales agents or directly contact insurance companies behave as if they care
a lot more about risk rating than others. One interpretation of this result is that while
everyone starts with a prior that puts much weight on the risk ratings, those with lower
information processing cost revise their weights downwards.
Approximately half of all retirees who choose annuity show no preference for a bequest.
There is, however, considerable heterogeneity among those who value bequests: Those in the
lowest and highest savings quintiles, on average, care 1.92 and 2.82 times more about their
spouse than themselves, respectively.
Using our demographic information, we also estimate the survival probability for each
retiree. Comparing the expected mortality with the model-implied annuitization costs, we
find that retirees who may live longer have higher annuitization costs. We find significant
heterogeneity in these costs across retirees’ and across retirees’ savings. However, the average
annuitization costs do not increase with savings, despite the fact that in our estimation those
4Existing literature (e.g., Lockwood, 2018) identifies the bequest preference only indirectly from savings.
5Our identification strategy does not rely on optimal bidding in the first stage, which involves submitting
bids for several types of annuities. Without the first-stage model, however, we cannot determine the ex-ante
expected profit, so we cannot identify the entry costs.
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with higher savings live longer, which in turn is consistent with other studies (e.g., Attanasio
and Emmerson, 2003) that document a negative correlation between wealth and mortality.
The average costs do not increase with savings quintiles because for the top two quintiles
with 0.14 probability, firms’ annuitization costs are less than actuarially fair self-annuitization
costs. This probability drops to 0.06 for the rest.
To quantify the effect of asymmetric information on pensions and retirees’ ex-post ex-
pected utilities, we simulate the equilibrium pension under the assumption that the firms
observe each other’s annuitization costs while shutting down the risk ratings. We find that
the gap between the observed pensions and the complete-information pensions is the largest
for retirees who belong to the top two savings quintiles.
This result is even though low savers value risk ratings the most, and they stand to
benefit the most. However, our estimates suggest that because firms’ risk ratings are not too
different, at least for the two most competitive firms, differences in costs are more important
in determining pensions than risk ratings’ preferences.
Next, we evaluate the effect of replacing the current pricing mechanism with simpler
English auctions while shutting down the role of risk ratings. Similar to the complete infor-
mation counterfactual, we find that using English auctions increases pensions for everyone.
However, the gain is minimal for the retirees whose savings belong to the lowest three quin-
tiles. However, we find that these changes do not translate into large gains in ex-post
expected present discounted utilities because either the increase is minimal (for those with
lower savings) or they increase (for those with high savings). These retirees have higher
pensions than other retirees, and because of diminishing marginal utilities, the utility gains
from English auctions are minimal.
In the remainder of the paper we proceed as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the
institutional detail; and in Section 3, we describe our data. Section 4, presents our model and
Section 5 discusses its identification. Sections 6 and 7 present estimation and counterfactual
results, respectively and Section 8 concludes. The appendix includes additional details.
2 Institutional Background
The Chilean pension system went through a major reform in the early 1980s, when it tran-
sitioned from a pay-as-you-go system to a system of fully funded capitalization in individual
accounts run by private pension funds (henceforth, AFPs). Under this system, workers must
contribute 10% of their monthly earnings, up to a pre-predetermined maximum (which in
5
2018 was U.S. $2,319), into accounts that are managed by the AFPs.6
Upon reaching the minimum retirement age –60 years for woman and 65 years for men–
individuals can request an old-age pension, transforming their savings into a stream of pen-
sion payments. In this paper, we focus only on those retirees who have savings in their
retirement accounts, that are above a certain threshold, who can, and must, participate in
the electronic annuity market.7
Regulation
The Chilean government regulates and supervises AFPs, who manage retirement savings
during the accumulation phase, and life insurance companies, who provide annuities during
the decumulation phase. In addition, at the time of retirement, the government provides
subsidies to workers who fail to save enough during their working years (Fajnzylber, 2018).
Moreover, the life insurance industry is heavily regulated. The current regulatory frame-
work for life insurance companies providing annuities recognizes that the main risks associ-
ated with annuities are the risk of longevity and reinvestment. Longevity risk is taken care of
through the creation of technical reserves by insurers that sell annuities, which consider self-
adjusting mortality tables. The government also regularly assesses the risk of reinvestment
via the Asset Sufficiency Test established in 2007. Under this regulation, every insurance
company is required to establish additional technical reserves, if and when there are “insuffi-
cient” asset flows, following the international norm of good regulatory practices in insurance
industries. Bankruptcy among life insurance companies is rare in Chile, but the government
guarantees every retiree pensions up to 100% of the basic solidarity pension, and 75% of the
excess pension over this amount, up to a ceiling of 45 UFs (see footnote 6). Thus, there are
enough safety nets for retirees to feel protected in case of a bankruptcy.
2.1 Pension Products
Retirees participating in the electronic market have three main choices: programmed with-
drawal (PW), immediate annuity (IA), and deferred annuity (DA).8 Under PW, savings
remain under AFP management and are paid back to the retiree following an actuarially
6This maximum, and annuities in general, are expressed in Unidades de Fomento (UF), which is a unit of
account used in Chile. UF follows the evolution of the Consumer Price Index and is widely used in long-term
contracts. In 2018, the UF was approximately equivalent to U.S. $39.60.
7The threshold is currently established as the amount required to finance a Basic Solidarity Pension,
which is the minimum pension guaranteed by the state. Retirees with insufficient funds will receive them
from the AFP based on a programmed withdrawal schedule.
8There is a fourth, rarely chosen, pension product which is a combination between a PW and an IA.
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fair benefit schedule. In the event of death, remaining funds are used to finance survivor-
ship pensions or, in absence of eligible beneficiaries, become part of the retiree’s inheritance.
PW benefits are exposed to financial volatility and provide no longevity insurance so that,
barring extraordinarily high returns, the pension steadily decreases over time.
Under both IA and DA, the retiree’s savings are transferred to an insurance company of
her choice that will provide an inflation-indexed monthly pension to her and her surviving
beneficiaries. In deferred annuities, pensions are contracted for a future date (usually between
one and three years), and in the meantime the retiree is allowed to receive a temporary benefit
that can be as high as twice the pension amount.
Thus, the main trade-off between an annuity and a PW is that an annuity provides
insurance against longevity risk and financial risk whereas under a PW a retiree can bequeath
all remaining funds in case of an early death. Moreover, while annuitization is an irreversible
decision, a retiree who chooses a PW can switch and choose an annuity at a later date.
Annuities may also include a special coverage clause called a guaranteed period (GP).9
If an annuity includes, for instance, a 10-year guaranteed period, the full pension will be
paid during this period to the retiree, eligible beneficiaries or other individuals. Once the
guaranteed period is reached, the contracts reverts to the standard conditions (implying a
certain percentage of the original pension and only for eligible beneficiaries).10
For illustration of how benefits change with the annuity products and marital status,
consider a male retiree who is 65 years old, has a savings of U.S. $200,000 and is retiring in
2020. Suppose he is unmarried and chooses an annuity with GP=0 and DP=0, then he gets
a constant pension until death (blue ‘’ in Figure 1-(a)), but after that his beneficiaries gets
nothing (blue ‘’ in Figure 1-(b)). But if he chooses an annuity with GP=20, then while
alive he gets lower pension (compare red ‘+’ and blue ‘’ in Figure 1-(a)), but if he dies
within 20 years of retirement, his beneficiaries get a strictly positive amount (purple ‘x’ in
Figure 1-(b)) for 20 years, and after that they get nothing. If he was married, then even
with GP=0 and DP=0 (blue ‘’ in Figure 1-(c)), the beneficiaries will get a positive amount
(blue ‘’ in Figure 1-(d)) after the retiree dies.
2.2 Retirement Process
The process of buying an annuity begins when a worker communicates her decision of con-
sidering retirement to her designated AFP. We assume that she is then exogenously matched
with one of four intermediaries or “channels” who can help her choose a product and firm.
9Another rarely chosen clause is the spouse’s percentage increase, which maintains the full payment to
the surviving spouse, instead of the mandated 50% or 60% for regular contracts.
10In our sample, 99.9% of the chosen annuities correspond to contracts with 0, 10, 15, or 20 years of GP.
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Figure 1: Benefit Schedules, by Annuity Type





















































































Note: The figure shows the survival-contingent benefit schedules for retirees and their beneficiaries for a
representative retiree in our data, who is a 65-year-old male with savings of U.S. $200,000. Subfigures (a) and
(b) shows the pension and bequest schedules, respectively, for four types of annuities and if he is unmarried.
Similarly, subfigures (c) and (d), show the pension and benefit schedules when he is married. All calculations
are performed by the authors using the official 2020 mortality table. GP stands for guaranteed period (in
years) and DP stands for deferred period (in years).
Out of these four channels, two (AFP and insurance company) are free and the other two
(sales agent and independent advisor) charge fees. Retirees must also disclose information
on all eligible beneficiaries.11 The AFP then generates a Balance Certificate that contains
information about the total saving account balance (henceforth, just savings) and her demo-
graphic characteristics. Then the decision process can be described in the following steps:
1. The retiree requests offers for different types of pension products (described above).12
Upon request, insurance companies in the system have eight business days to make an
offer (for every requested annuity products).
2. These offers (i.e., bids) are collected and collated by the SCOMP system and presented
to the retiree as a Certificate of Quotes. The certificate is in the form of a table, one
for each type of annuity, sorted from the highest to the lowest pensions along with the
company’s name and risk-rating.13
11The main beneficiaries are the retiree’s spouse and their children under age 24.
12Retirees can request quotes up to 13 different variations, including PW and annuities with different
combinations of contractual arrangements.
13In the case of guaranteed periods, the certificate also includes a discount rate that would be applicable
in the event of death within the GP. In absence of legal beneficiaries, other relatives can receive the unpaid
benefits in a lump sum, calculated with the offered discount rate. For an example see Figure 1.
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3. The retiree can choose from the following five options: (i) postpone retirement; (ii) fill
a new request for quotes (presumably for different types of annuities); (iii) choose PW;
(iv) accept one of the first round offers for a particular type of annuity; or (v) negotiate
with companies by requesting second round offers for one type of annuity. In the latter
case, firms cannot offer lower than their initial round offers, and the individual can
always fall back to any first round offer.14
3 Data
We have data on the annuity market in Chile from January 2007 to December 2017. We
observe everyone who used SCOMP to buy an annuity or choose PW during this period.
As mentioned before, we observe everything about a retiree that participating life insurance
companies observe about them before they make their entry decisions and their first round
offers. We observe all the offers they received, their final choice, and whether they chose
it in the first round or the second round. Our working assumption is that retirees use the
first round offers to decide between different types of annuities in most cases. Furthermore,
conditional on choosing the annuity type, they bargain with companies for better pensions
in the second round.
3.1 Retirees
Table 1: Share of Pension Products
Product Obs. %
PW 78,161 32.7
Immediate annuity 87,115 36.4
Deferred annuity 73,272 30.6
Annuity with PW 343 0.9
Full Sample 238,891 100
Note: The table shows the distribution of retirees across different annuity products. We restrict ourselves
to annuities with either 0, 10, 15 or 20 years of guaranteed periods or at most 3 years of deferment.
We focus on individuals without eligible children considering retirement within ten years
of the “normal retirement age” (NRA), which is 60 years for a woman and 65 years for a
man. The result is a data set with 238,891 retirees, with an almost even split between PW,
14A firm that does not offer in the first round cannot participate in the second round.
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immediate annuities, and deferred annuities: see Table 1. Less than 1% of retirees choose
annuity with PW, and so we exclude them, leaving a total of 238,548 retirees.15
Table 2: Age Distribution, by Gender and Marital Status
Retiring Age S-F M-F S-M M-M Total
Before NRA 1,871 1,771 4,714 22,142 30,498
At NRA 20,789 22,475 17,114 72,572 132,950
Within 3 years after NRA 14,470 16,797 4,447 19,086 54,800
At least 4 years after NRA 6,900 6,715 1,251 5,434 20,300
Full Sample 44,030 47,758 27,526 119,234 238,548
Note: The table displays the distribution of retirees, by their marital status, gender and their retirement
ages. Thus the first two columns ‘S-F’ and ‘M-F’ refer, respectively, to single female and married female,
and so on. NRA is the ‘normal retirement age,’ which is 60 years for a female and 65 years for a male.
In Table 2, we present the sample distribution by retirees’ marital status, gender, and
age at the time of their retirement. Around 56% retire at their NRA, and 79% retiree at
or at most within three years after NRA (rows 2 and 3), and married men are half of all
retirees. Retirees also vary in terms of their savings; see Table 3. The mean savings in
our sample is $112,471, while the median savings is $74,515 with an inter-quartile range of
$85,907. Savings are higher for men and for those who retire before NRA.
Table 3: Savings, by Retirement Age and Gender
Mean Median P25 P75 N
Retiring Age
Before NRA 185,660 129,637 73,104 245,857 30,498
At NRA 89,907 60,023 41,521 103,680 132,950
Within 3 years after NRA 115,666 87,126 54,353 135,562 54,800
At least 4 years after NRA 141,673 101,594 58,815 168,202 20,300
Full Sample 112,471 74,515 46,449 132,356 238,548
Gender
Female 97,308 81,180 51,817 121,633 91,788
Male 121,955 69,372 43,818 147,184 146,760
Full Sample 112,471 74,515 46,449 132,356 238,548
Note: Summary statistics of savings, in U.S. dollars, by retiree’s age at retirement, and by retiree’s gender.
3.1.1 First Round Offers
A retiree receives approximately 10.6 offers for several types of annuity, and the number of
offers increases with savings. For example, retirees with savings at the 75th percentile of our
15The fourth option allows retirees to split their savings into PW and annuity.
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sample get an average of 12.4 offers, and those at the 25th percentile get an average of 7.8
offers. It is reasonable to assume that retirees with higher savings are more lucrative for
the firms, and therefore more companies are willing to annuitize their savings. If those with
higher savings, however, also live longer than those with lower savings, then it means that
annuitizing higher savings is costlier for the firms. To determine which of these two opposing
forces dominate, we estimate the annuitization costs and mortality by savings.
Moreover, there is also substantial variation in the pensions offered across life insurance
companies and retirees; see Table 4. For an immediate annuity, retirees get an average offer
of $570, and for deferred annuities, the average offer is $446. On average, women get an
offer of $479 for immediate annuities and $412 for deferred annuities, while for men, they
are $631 and $473 respectively. These features are consistent with men having larger savings
and shorter life expectancy than women (see Table 7).
Table 4: Monthly Pension Offers, by Annuity type and Gender
Savings Savings Savings Savings Savings
Annuity Type Gender Mean Median Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Immediate Female 479 414 202 288 385 510 857
Male 631 435 200 269 372 585 1329
Full Sample 570 423 201 278 378 556 1152
Deferred Female 412 374 190 258 349 463 714
Male 473 356 187 241 331 529 1019
Full Sample 446 365 189 248 339 500 882
Note: Summary of average monthly pensions (in U.S. dollars) offers received in the first round.
In our empirical model, we rationalize this variation in pension offers by allowing firms
to have heterogeneous costs (UNCs) of annuitization. We assume that only the firm knows
its annuitization cost, which can depend on retirees’ savings. An important exogenous factor
affecting UNCs is the market interest rate, which affects the opportunity cost of offering a
pension at retirement. Our sample spans a decade, so we observe substantial variation in
interest rates, which causes exogenous variation in annuitization costs.
3.1.2 Chosen Annuities
Once the participating companies make first round offers, one for each type of annuity the
retiree requests quotes for, she can either choose from one of those offers or buy a PW, or
initiate the second round bargaining phase. Table 5 displays the distribution across these
stages. Most retirees who choose PW choose that in the first round (98.1%), and most
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retirees (86.9%) who choose annuity choose in the second round. As we can see, 2,979
retirees opt for the second round but choose an annuity quote from the first round.
Table 5: Number of Retirees who choose in First or Second Round
Round/Choice PW 1st round 2nd round Total
1st round 76,690 18,001 0 94,691
2nd round 1,471 2,979 139,407 143,857
Total 78,161 20,980 139,407 238,548
Note: Round refers to whether retirees chose in the first or second round.
In Table 6, we present information about the chosen annuities: (i) the total number of
accepted offers by the type of annuity; (ii) the average number of first round and second
round offers received for the chosen annuity; (iii) the number of accepted second round offers;
(iv) the average percentage increase in pension offers from first round to second round (only
for the accepted choice); (v) the percentage of retirees who requested at least one second
round offer; (vi) the percentage of retirees who chose the highest-paying alternative; and
(vii) the percentage of retirees who chose a dominated option, in terms of either pension
(with the same risk-rating) or risk ratings (with the same pension) or both.
Table 6: Summary of Accepted Annuities
GP # Average # of # Accepted in Average %
Months Accepted 1st Round Offers 2nd Round Increase Requested 2nd Round Best Dominated
Immediate
0 21,292 11.3 16,357 1.5 80 59 22
120 26,907 11.1 23,463 1.3 89 51 28
180 24,452 11.6 22,070 1.4 92 49 29
240 14,464 11.8 13,020 1.5 92 51 29
Total 87,115 11.4 74,910 1.4 88 53 27
Deferred
0 11,703 10.9 8,919 1.5 79 53 23
120 26,119 11.0 23,390 1.4 91 46 31
180 26,775 11.4 24,324 1.4 92 42 34
240 8,675 11.0 7,864 1.3 92 42 34
Total 73,272 11.1 64,497 1.4 90 45 31
Note: The table shows the number of chosen annuities by type of product, the average number of first round
offers received for the chosen annuity, the number of accepted offers that resulted from second round offers,
the average percentage increase between the first round and second round offers (for the accepted choice),
the percentage of individuals who requested at least one second round offer, the percentage of retirees who
chose the highest-paying alternative option and the percentage of individuals who chose an offer that was
dominated by another alternative with same (or better) credit rating.
From Table 6, we see that some retirees do not choose the annuity with the highest
pension. One way to rationalize this behavior is to recognize that besides pensions, retirees
also care about firms’ risk ratings. After all, risk-rating is a proxy of financial health, and
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it is also widely advertised as such. A retiree can prefer lower pensions from healthier firms
to a higher pension from a less healthy firm.
This rationalization, however, begs the follow-up questions: Is there an objective (i.e.,
correct) trade-off between pension and risk-rating, and should it be homogeneous or vary
across retirees? If it is heterogeneous, should it increase or decrease with savings? On the
one hand, because of the regulation, those with lower savings are less exposed to the risk of
firms defaulting than those with higher savings; those with higher savings should care more
about the risk ratings than those with lower savings. On the other hand, savings positively
correlated with education, so those with higher savings will process publicly available infor-
mation about past defaults. Thus, in the case of Chile this suggests that retirees should not
care much about the risk-rating. Finally, how does this trade-off vary with preferences for
bequests? To determine which of these countervailing forces dominate and how pensions and
utilities would change under alternative market rules, later we estimate a structural model.
3.1.3 Mortality
A determinant of annuity demand and supply is the retiree’s expected mortality. We observe
every retiree when they entered our sample, i.e., their retirement age and their age at death
if they die by the end of our sample period. Using this information, we estimate a mixed
proportional hazard model (defined shortly below) and use the estimated survival function
to predict the expected life conditional on being alive at retirement.
Let the hazard rate for retiree i with socioeconomic characteristics Xi at time t ∈ R+,




= h(Xi) × ψ(t), where mi is i’s realized mortality date,
ψ(t) is the baseline hazard rate. Furthermore, let the hazard function ψ(t) be given by
Gompertz distribution, such that the probability of i’s death by time t is Fm(t;λi, g) =
1− exp(−λi
g
(exp(gt)− 1)), and let λi = exp(X>i τ).
The identification of such a model is well established in the literature (Van Den Berg,
2001). The maximum likelihood estimated coefficients of the hazard functions suggest a
smaller hazard risk is associated with younger cohorts, individuals who retire later, with
females, those who are married, and those with higher savings.16 Using these estimates, we
report the median expected lives, by gender and savings quintile, and their standard errors
in Table 7. Overall, 50% of males expect to live until 86 years, and 50% of females expect
to live until they are 94.9 years old. As we can see, those who have larger savings also tend
16For robustness, we estimated the Gompertz model using data from before the introduction of SCOMP.
The estimates are qualitatively the same. For instance, the predicted median expected life at death is 85
and 96 for males and females, respectively. Both of these results are available upon request.
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to live longer than those with lower savings.
Table 7: Median Expected Life, by Savings Quintile
Savings Male Female Overall
Q1 85.15 93.80 86.89
(5.79) (6.03) (5.82)
Q2 85.86 94.24 87.64
(5.81) (6.06) (5.84)
Q3 86.45 94.83 88.23
(5.83) (6.09) (5.88)
Q4 87.62 95.48 89.40
(5.88) (6.12) (5.95)
Q5 90.87 97.25 93.52
(6.01) (6.21) (6.11)
Total 86.75 94.91 89.57
(5.82) (6.09) (5.94)
Note: The table shows the predicted median expected life at the time of retirement implied by our estimates
of the Gompertz mortality distribution. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses.
3.2 Intermediary Channels
We observe retirees with one of the four intermediary channels (AFP, insurance company,
sales agent, or independent advisor) to assist them with their annuitization process. If and
when such an intermediary’s incentives do not align with those of a retiree, then retirees
do not always choose the “best” option for them. The misalignment of incentives may be
particularly relevant for sales agents, who receive their intermediation fee only if the retiree
chooses the sales agent’s firm. In other words, it is possible and very likely that those with
a sales agent would appear to value the non-pecuniary benefits of a company more than the
pecuniary benefits. We allow preferences for risk ratings and information processing costs
to depend on the channel to capture this effect.
To account for observed differences among retirees, we consider the money’s worth ra-
tio (henceforth, mwr), which is the expected present value of pension per annuitized dollar.
If mwr = 1, then it means the retiree expects to get $1 pension (in present value) for ev-
ery annuitized dollar. In Figure 2, we display the distributions of the mwr offered in the
first round (left panel) and mwr accepted by the retirees (right panel). The mean and the
median mwr of the offers, by channels (AFP, insurance company, sales agent, advisor), are
(0.989, 0.988, 0.984, 0.987) and (0.990, 0.989, 0.986, 0.988), respectively, but the means and
medians for accepted offers are (1.010, 1.010, 0.990, 1.007) and (1.010, 1.009, 0.991, 1.007), re-
spectively. Thus, the final accepted offers are on average better than the first round offers,
and those with sales agents have lower mwr.
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Figure 2: CDFs of Offered and Accepted MWR, by Channel
Note: Distributions of the offered and chosen mwr (left panel vs. right panel), by channel.
We use a multinomial logit model to consider if observed differences among retirees can
explain the differences in their channels see; Table 8. In particular, we estimated the log-
odds ratio of having one of the three intermediary channels relative to the AFP and found
that some characteristics and the channel are correlated. For instance, those who have lower
savings, retire early, are male or unmarried are more likely to use sales agents than AFP.
Table 8: Intermediary Channel - Estimates from Multinomial Logit
Regressors \ Channels Insurance Company Sales-Agent Advisor
Savings ($million) 0.629*** -0.857*** -0.130***
(0.128) (0.0436) (0.0447)
Age 0.0131 -0.0408*** -0.0816***
(0.00857) (0.00189) (0.00218)
Female 0.437*** -0.0588*** -0.124***
(0.0546) (0.0120) (0.0140)
Married 0.0245 0.0620*** 0.0874***
(0.0491) (0.0107) (0.0127)
Constant -5.029*** 2.333*** 4.326***
(0.560) (0.123) (0.142)
N 238,548 238,548 238,548
Note. Estimates of multinomial logit regression for channels, where the baseline choice is AFP. Standard
errors are in parentheses, and ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ denote p-values less than 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1, respectively.
We treat the channel as exogenous for model tractability. There are two reasons why
we believe this is not as strong an assumption in our context as it might appear. First,
several anecdotal evidence from Chile suggests that most people rely on word-of-mouth
when it comes to a channel. Second, and as mentioned previously, we observe everything
the firm observes about a retiree when making the first round offers. When we estimate
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the preference parameters, we estimate them separately for several groups that we define
based on age, gender, savings, and channels. Estimating preference parameters separately
for each group allows us to control the effects of potential selection based on unobservable
characteristics.
For instance, from Table 9, we see that channels affect the outcomes. Out of 109,786
retirees who choose AFP, only 25.1% choose the second round, whereas the shares are 85.2%,
92.0%, and 87.8% for insurance company, sales agents, or advisors, respectively. Most of
those who choose PW have AFP, and those with sales agents are least likely to choose PW.
Table 9: Retiree choices, by Intermediary Channel
N Requests 2nd Round Chooses PW Chooses in 2nd Round
AFP 109,786 0.251 0.661 0.235
Company 2,169 0.852 0.066 0.817
Sales-agent 79,120 0.920 0.030 0.907
Advisor 47,473 0.878 0.066 0.846
Full Sample 238,548 0.603 0.328 0.584
Note: Proportion of retirees separated by their choices and their channel.
Our empirical framework can capture the effect of channels on outcomes. In particular,
we posit that channels affect the cost of acquiring information about the importance of risk-
rating. For instance, we allow those retirees who use sales agents to act “as if” they have
a higher cost of acquiring information about the trade-off between risk-rating and pensions.
We assume that in the first stage, retirees are rationally inattentive with respect to their
preference for risk ratings, but they know their preferences in the second stage.
3.3 Firms
In our sample, we observe 20 unique life insurance companies, and they differ in terms of
their annuitization costs, which are unobserved, and in terms of their risk ratings. Table
10 shows the distribution of risk ratings. The ratings mostly remain the same over time,
and most companies have high (at least AA) risk ratings. For our empirical analysis, we
treat these ratings as exogenous, and group them into three categories: 3 for the highest risk
rating of AA+, 2 for all the risk ratings from AA to A, and 1 for the rest.
Although there are 20 unique firms, not all of them are active at all times, and not all
participate in every auction. On average, 11 companies participate in a retiree auction,
which suggests that the market is competitive. We define potential entrants (for each retiree
auction) as the set of active firms that participated in at least one other retiree auction in
the same month. In our sample, retirees have either 13, 14, or 15 potential entrants.
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Table 10: Risk ratings
Rating Frequency % Cumulative %
AA+ 155 24.64 24.64
AA 245 38.95 63.59
AA- 171 27.19 90.78
A+ 2 0.32 91.1
A 15 2.38 93.48
BBB+ 1 0.16 93.64
BBB 6 0.95 94.59
BBB- 15 2.38 96.98
BB+ 19 3.02 100
Total 629 100
Note: The table shows the distribution of quarterly credit ratings from 2007-2018.
The participation rate, which is the ratio of the number of actual bidders to the number
of potential bidders, varies across our sample from as low as 0.08 to as high as 1, with mean
and median rates of 0.73 and 0.78, respectively, and a standard deviation of 0.18.17 Thus,
it is likely that a firm’s decision to participate depends on its financial position when a
retiree requests quotes and this opportunity cost of participating can vary across retirees.18
To capture this selection, in our empirical application, we follow Samuelson (1985) to model
firms’ entry decisions, which posits that firms observe their retiree-specific annuitization cost
before entry. This entry method is a reasonable assumption in our setting because firms have
sophisticated models to predict retirees’ mortality and the expected returns from the savings.
We treat firms as symmetric bidders with annuitization costs independently and iden-
tically distributed with some (unknown) distribution function. We do not observe firms’
annuitization costs, and so, we cannot directly test this assumption. However, we can per-
form a diagnostic test and check if the firm-specific pension (bid) distributions are different.
If they are not different from one another, then our symmetry assumption is a reasonable
first step.
However, to perform this test, we have to “control” for all relevant factors that can affect
the pension. For instance, retirees with high savings can be lucrative because the total gain
from annuitizing their savings will be large. However, as we have seen above, these retirees
are expected to live longer. To compare the bids across firms, we have to estimate the
17Using a Poisson regression of the number of participating firms on the retiree characteristics, we find
that one standard deviation increase in savings, which is approximately $87,000, is associated with roughly
one more entrant. Moreover, women have 0.61 more participating companies than men, while sales agents
and advisors are associated with approximately 0.19 fewer participants than the other two channels.
18We tested this selection by estimating a Heckman selection model with the number of potential bidders
as the excluded variable and found strong evidence of negative-selection among firms.
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expected discounted life for each retiree, which we refer to as UNCi where the subscript i
refers to retiree i. This UNCi is different from UNCj, where the latter refers to a firm j’s
cost. We formally define UNCi when we present our model’s supply side, and in Appendix
A.1 we detail how we use the estimates from the mortality distribution to calculate UNCi.
But for now, it is sufficient to know that UNCi depends on i’s estimated mortality and the
discount factor. A retiree who expects to live longer will have a larger UNCi and will be
costlier for firms to annuitize, but these costs are unobserved.
For each of the 20 firms, in Figure 3 we present the histograms and scatter plots of
monthly pension per annuitized dollar (which is known as the monthly pension rate) and
the UNCis of all the retirees that the firms make offers to in the first stage. Using pension
rates instead of pensions allows us to compare across different retirees. As we see, indeed
UNCi and pension rates are negatively correlated, and there are no differences across firms.
Now, using these UNCis, we can compare pensions across firms. We normalize the offered
pension rates (ratio of monthly pension to annuitized savings) across firms, and compare the
distributions across firms. We say that firms are asymmetric if the distributions are different
and symmetric otherwise. For each firm we estimate
Pension-Ratei,j = constant + β1 × UNCi + β2 × Agei + β3 × Genderi
+β4 × Marital Statusi + β5 × Spouse’s Agei
+β6 × Guaranteed Monthsi + β7 × Potential Biddersi + εi,j, (1)
using ordinary least squares method, and predict the residual ε̂i,j for retiree i and firm j. In
Figure 4, we show the Kernel density estimate of the firm-specific distribution of ε̂i,j. We
can see that these 20 distributions are very similar, so it is reasonable to say that firms have
symmetric cost distribution.
4 Model
In this section, we introduce our model. To model the demand, we consider the decision
problem facing a retiree who uses SCOMP to choose a company to annuitize her savings.
To model the utility from an annuity, we closely follow the extant literature on annuities,
particularly, Einav, Finkelstein, and Schrimpf (2010), with a modification that accounts for
heterogeneous preferences for firm characteristics.
As we have shown before, retirees do not always choose the best offer. To rationalize
this, we posit that besides the pecuniary aspect of an annuity, retirees also care about a
company’s risk ratings, which is a proxy for the likelihood of default. That said, we assume
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Figure 3: Pension Rates and UNCi for each Firm
Note: These are histograms and scatter plots of monthly pension rate, i.e., the ratio of monthly pension to
annuitized savings, and the UNCi of the retirees the firms make an offer. There are 20 firms, so there are 20
sets of four subfigures each. Clockwise, the first subfigure is the histogram of UNCi, and the second subfigure
is the scatter plot of the pension rates (on the x-axis) and UNCi (on the y-axis). The third subfigure is the
histogram of the pension rates, and the last subfigure is the scatter plot of UNCi and the pension rates.
that all retirees have a prior that puts much emphasis on risk-rating, and only those who
spend some resources learning about the likelihood of default will update their prior and
choose accordingly. To capture the trade-off between pension, risk ratings, and information
gathering, we follow Matëjka and McKay (2015) and model the retiree as a rationally inat-
tentive decision maker. If a retiree chooses to go to the second round bargaining, we assume
that she knows her risk ratings preferences.
On the supply side, we model the imperfect competition using an extensive form game
where the first stage is a first-price auction with independent private value and endogenous
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Figure 4: Distributions of Homogenized Pension Rates, by Firms
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Note: Kernel estimates of the distribution residuals ε̂ij from Equation (1), one for each firm.
entry (Samuelson, 1985). If there is a second stage, then it is multilateral bargaining with
one-sided asymmetric information. The winner of the game is not always the firm that
offers the highest pension because the probability of winning depends on the bids and the
preferences for risk-rating and bequest, which can vary across retirees.
4.1 Demand
Here, we consider the problem faced by an annuitant i who has already decided which annuity
product to choose (e.g., an immediate annuity with 0 guaranteed period) and is considering
between Ji firms who have decided to participate in the auction for i’s savings Si. The retiree
will choose the firm that provides her the highest indirect utility.
We assume that the utility from an annuity consists of three parts: the expected present
discounted utility from the monthly pension that the retiree enjoys while alive, utility she
gets from leaving bequest (if any) to her kin, and her preference for firm’s risk rating.
Retirees may value the risk ratings because they may dislike firms with lower risk ratings.
However, they may not know the “correct” weight to put on these risk ratings. To capture
this uncertainty, we model retirees as rationally inattentive decision makers. We explain this
aspect shortly below, but for ease of exposition, we begin without rational inattention.
Let (θi, βi) denote i’s preferences for bequest and risk-rating, respectively, and given
savings S are distributed independently and identically across retirees as F̃θ(·|S) × Fβ(·|S)
on [0, θ]× [β, β]. To capture the fact that retirees might not be able to afford bequest, and
therefore will act as someone who does not care about bequest we allow F̃θ to have a mass
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point at θ = 0. Letting ζ ∈ (0, 1) be the probability that the retiree has θi = 0, and let
Fθ(·) = ζ×H(0)+(1−ζ)×F̃θ(·) where, H(0) is a Heaviside function and F̃θ is the continuous
distribution on (0, θ], θ <∞.
Let Pij denote the pension offered by firm j to retiree i. Given the type of annuity and
the pension Pij, i’s expected mortality and the mortality of her beneficiaries determine the
bequest, which we denote by Bij(Pij). Whenever it is clear from the context, we suppress
the dependence of Bij on Pij. Let i’s indirect utility at retirement from choosing an annuity
with pension and bequest (Pij, Bij) from firm j with risk rating Zi,j ∈ {1, 2, 3} be
Uij = U(Pij, Bij; θi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
i’s discounted utility
+ βi × Zj,︸ ︷︷ ︸
i’s preference for j’s risk-rating
− U0i(Si),︸ ︷︷ ︸
outside utility
(2)
where the utility U0i(Si) is the utility associated with the outside option.
Next, we explain the expected present discounted utility, U(Pij, Bij; θi). For simplicity,
consider only the first month after retirement, and let qi be the probability of being alive
one month after retirement. Then, the expected present discounted utility will be
U(Pij, Bij(Pij); θi) = u(Pij)× qi + θi × v(Bij(Pij))× (1− qi),
where u(Pij) is the utility from Pij, and v(Bij) is the utility from leaving a bequest Bij.
Thus, the marginal utility from leaving a bequest Bij upon death is θi × (1− qit)× v′(Bij).
Now, let us consider two periods after retirement. We have to adjust the probability that
the retiree survives two periods given that she is alive at retirement and take into account
that the bequest left upon death will also change, which in turn depends on whether the
annuity product under consideration includes a guaranteed period.
In practice, we do not know for how long i expects to live. So, to determine expected
longevity at retirement, we estimate a continuous-time Gompertz survival function for i
and her spouse (if she is married) as a function of her demographic and socioeconomic
characteristics. Once we have the survival probabilities, the expected discounted utilities
become the product of u(Pij) and the discounted number of months i expects to live, where
the discount factor is the market interest rate.
Even with a bequest, U(Pij, Bij(Pij); θi) has an intuitive structure. It is a sum of two
terms, one of which is the product of u(Pij) and the discounted number of months i expects
to live, and the other term is the product of v(Bij) times the discounted number of months
i’s beneficiaries expect to receive Bij. Legally, i’s spouse is entitled to 60% of i’s pension,
and 100% during the guaranteed periods; the amount Bij may change over time.
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Thus, we can write U(Pij, Bij(Pij); θi) as
U(Pij, Bij(Pij); θi) := u(Pij)×DRi + θi
(




≡ ρi(Pij) + θi × bi(Pij), (3)
where DRi is the discounted expected longevity of the retiree (in months, from the moment
the annuity payments start) and DS,GPi is the discounted number of months that the spouse
(or other beneficiaries) will receive the full pension because of the guaranteed period. Fur-
thermore, DSi is the discounted number of months that the spouse will receive 60% of the
retiree’s pension.19 If the annuity has a deferred period, then the retiree gets twice her pen-
sion until the annuity payment begins. So ρi(Pij) = u(Pij) ×DRi + u(2Pij) ×D
R,DP
i where
DR,DPi is the expected life during the deferred period.
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However, a retiree can have additional wealth, besides Si, that she can use for con-
sumption or bequest, especially those who are wealthy. However, we do not observe her
consumption (after retirement) or her wealth, so following the literature (Mitchell et al.,
1999; Einav, Finkelstein, and Schrimpf, 2010; Illanes and Padi, 2019), we assume that re-
tirees have homothetic preferences. In particular, we assume that all retirees have CRRA
utility u(c) = v(c) = c
(1−γ)
1−γ with γ = 3. Homothetic preferences imply that the retiree’s
annuity choice does not depend on the unobserved wealth. In Appendix A.1, we detail the
steps to estimate ρi(Pij) and bi(Pij).
Substituting (3) in (2) we can express i’s indirect utility from annuity Pij from firm j as
Uij = ρi(Pij) + θi × bi(Pij) + βi × Zij − U0i(Si). (4)
Thus, (4) shows that there is a trade-off between higher pensions and lower risk ratings, but
as mentioned above, we assume that i does not know her βi, but only its distribution.
We follow Matëjka and McKay (2015) and assume that before the retirement process
begins, i has a belief that βi
i.i.d∼ Fβ(·) with support [β, β], and if i wants to learn her
preference, she has to incur information processing cost, valued at α > 0 per unit of in-
19These “discounted life expectancies” also have interpretation in terms of the annuitization costs. As-
suming firms use the same mortality process as us and invest retirees’ savings at an interest rate equal to
the discount rate, then DRi is the necessary capital to provide a one-dollar pension to the retiree until she
dies. Similarly, DS,GPi is the necessary capital to finance a dollar of pension for the beneficiaries once the
retiree is dead and until the guaranteed period expires. Finally, DSi is the necessary capital to finance a
dollar of pension for the beneficiaries between the retiree’s death or the guaranteed period is over (whichever
occurs later) and until the spouse dies. The gains from trade between retirees and insurance companies come
from the differences in risk-attitude between retirees and life insurance companies and potential differences
between the discount rate of retirees and firms’ investment opportunities.
20For simplicity, we are disregarding survival benefits during the deferment period. Deferred periods in
our sample are at most three years. Thus, death probability is quite low.
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formation. So, i has first to decide how much to spend learning about βi, and after that
make the decision. Let σ : [β, β] × P → Γ := ∆([0, 1]J+1) denote the strategy of a re-
tiree with preference parameter β, with offered pensions P i := (Pi1, . . . , PiJ) ∈ P . The
strategy is a vector σ(β,P i) ≡ (σ1(β,P i), . . . , σJ(β,P i), σJ+1(β,P i)) of probabilities, where
σj(β,P i) = Pr(i chooses j|β,P i) ∈ [0, 1]. For notational simplicity, we suppress the de-
pendence of choice probabilities on the offers (P i). Then, by adapting Matëjka and McKay
(2015)’s choice formula to two periods, the probability that i chooses j is given by

























, j = J + 1.
(5)
4.2 Supply
Next, we present the supply side, where J insurance companies participate in an auction
run by “auctioneer” i with characteristics Xi ≡ (Si, X̃i). For simplicity, we suppress the
dependence on Xi and treat J as fixed, but account for selection in our empirical application.
Companies differ in terms of their UNCs. Thus, if j can annuitize i cheaper than j′, then
j has an advantage over j′ because all else equal, j can offer a higher pension. Let UNCRj be
j’s unitary necessary capital to finance a dollar pension for the retiree. Similarly, we must
consider the costs related to the bequest, which may come from two sources: a guaranteed
period, during which after the death of the retiree the beneficiaries receive the full amount
of the pension, and the compulsory survival benefit, according to which the spouse of the
retiree receives after the retiree died and after the guaranteed period is over, 60% of the
pension until death, see Equation (A.1). We denote by UNCS,GPj and UNC
S
j the present
value of the cost of providing these two benefits. Then, j’s expected cost of offering Pij is
C(Pij) := Pij × (UNCRj + 2× UNC
R,DP
j + 0.6× UNCSj + UNC
S,GP
j ) ≡ Pij × UNCj. (6)
Here, the 2 in (6) follows from our assumption that the life insurance company made the
pension payments during the deferred period. Let UNCi be the unitary cost of a pension
calculated with the retirees’ discount rate and the mortality process we estimate. For the
same retiree i, firms’ UNCs may differ from UNCi due to the differences in their (i) mortality
estimates, (ii) investment opportunities, and (iii) expectations about future interest rates.
For these reasons, it is more likely that only firm j knows its UNCj. Moreover, the ratio
of UNCj to UNCi captures j’s relative efficiency selling an annuity to i. Henceforth, we
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call this ratio rij ≡ UNCjUNCi , j’s relative cost of annuitizing a dollar. Working with r, we can
compare retirees who otherwise will have different UNCi’s.
We assume the cost rij is private and is distributed independently and identically across
companies as Wr(·|S), with density wr(·|S) that is strictly positive everywhere in its support
[r, r]. Thus, we assume that firms are symmetric, and this is consistent with what we observe
in the data; Figure 4. Allowing the cost distribution to depend on S captures the fact that
those who have higher savings tend to live longer and, therefore, are costlier to annuitize.
Ignoring for now the second round, and the multi-product nature of the first round, j’s
net present expected profit from offering Pij, to a retiree i with Si is
EΠIij(Pij) = (Si − Pij × UNCj))× Pr(j is chosen by offering Pij|Pi−j)
= Si × (1− rij × ρ∗i (Pij))× σij(Pi), (7)
where ρ∗i (Pij) ≡ Pij ×UNCi/Si is the money worth ratio (mwr) computed using the retirees’
discount rate, and σij(Pi) is the probability that i chooses j given the vector of offers Pi.
Considering the second round, and denoting by P̃ij the second round offer of firm j
Si × (1− rij × ρ∗i (Pij))× σij(Pi) + σiJ+1(Pi)× EΠIIj (ρ∗i (P̃ij)|rij,Pi), (8)
is its ex-ante expected profit, where σiJ+1(Pi) from (5) is the probability that i takes the
bargaining option in the second round with expected profit given by EΠIIj .
The two rounds are connected. First, more generous offers on the first round may lower
the retiree’s probability of going to the second round. Second, and more importantly, each
firm’s first round offer is binding for the second round: A firm cannot make any second round
offer below its first round one. Our focus in the empirical analysis will be on the second
round. For the first period, it suffices for our purposes to argue that firms will never make
first round offers that, if accepted by the retiree, would render expected non-positive profits.
Now, when we include the fact that i might request offers from Ai types of annuities,
insurance companies have to solve a multi-product bidding problem. As mentioned in the
timing assumptions, once i receives all the offers {P aij : a ∈ Ai, j ∈ J}, she chooses a∗ ∈ Ai
and then chooses the firm. Thus, with a slight abuse of notations, we can express the expected
profit of a firm j ∈ J from an auction where i requests offers for Ai types of annuities as
EΠij :=
∑
a∈Ai EΠij(a)× Pr(i chooses a|{P
b
i}b∈Ai ; θi).
Thus, in the first round, when choosing P aij, firm j has to consider the competition
from other firms for product a and all other types of annuities in Ai\{a}. It also has to
consider competition from its offers P bij, b ∈ Ai, b 6= a, which is the self-cannibalization
consideration facing multi-product firms. Determining the equilibrium bidding strategies
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for the first round auction, although conceptually straightforward, will require us first to
determine the equilibrium in the bargaining phase. However, irrespective of the first round
offers, to estimate Fβ and Wr it is sufficient to only consider the equilibrium outcome in the
second round. Under the assumption that by the second round, the retiree would already
know her βi and has already decided which a ∈ Ai to choose, the choice problem facing
the retiree is relatively straightforward: choose the offer that maximizes the utility (3).
Henceforth, we focus only on the second round bargaining, which is relatively simpler to
model and to use for estimation.
This multi-product feature means that to characterize the equilibrium first round offers
require solving a multi-dimensional bidding problem. The problem becomes more complex
when we consider the fact that at the time of making the first-round offers, it is unlikely
that firms know (βi, θi).
In our empirical application, we only use the chosen offers from the second round to infer
the annuitization costs’ distributions. Moreover, in the second round, it is more reasonable to
think that firms can learn retirees (β, θ) from the retirees. First, there are many interactions
between firms and retirees, so it is reasonable to assume that the firms will be able to (at
least) update their priors belief about βi. Second, given our assumption that retirees choose
the type of annuity in the first round, it is reasonably likely that in the second round, firms
will be able to know more about θi than they did in the first round.
We recognize that this is a strong assumption, but it allows us to keep the second round
bargaining game tractable. If retirees’ preferences were their private information, it would
lead to a bargaining game with two-sided asymmetric information. Even then, we would
have to make assumptions about firms’ updated beliefs about (βi, θi), and if and how the
updating varies across retirees. So from here, we assume that firms know (βi, θi) for those
who opt for the second round.
We model the second round as an alternating offer bargaining process. The game’s
timing is as follows: In an arbitrary order, firms sequentially choose whether to improve
their previous offer by a fixed amount ε or to “stay.” The process ends after the round with
all firms consecutively choosing to stay. Finally, the retiree then chooses any of the offers.
In Lemma 1, we formalize the analysis, with the proof in the Appendix A.3.
Before we proceed, we introduce some new notation. Let Pmaxij be the maximum firm
j can offer to i without losing money, i.e., Pmaxij solves C(P
max
ij ) = P
max
ij × UNCj = Si, or
equivalently 1 = rij × ρ∗i (Pmaxij ) and let j∗i denote the firm that can offer the highest utility
without losing money, i.e.,




ij ) + θi × bi(Pmaxij ) + βi × Zij.
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Lemma 1. In the bargaining game, firm j∗i wins the annuity contract and, as ε goes to zero,
ends up paying a pension P̃ij∗i such that
βi × Zij∗i + θibi(P̃ij∗i ) + ρi(P̃ij∗i ) = maxk 6=j∗i
{
βi × Zik + θibi(Pmaxik ) + ρi(Pmaxik )
}
. (9)
The symmetric behavioral strategies that sustain this perfect Bayesian equilibrium are:
1. For the retiree, choose whichever firm made the best offer (including non-pecuniary
attributes), i.e., retiree i chooses firm j∗i if
j∗i = arg max
j∈J
ρi(P̃ij) + θi × bi(P̃ij) + βi × Zij,
where P̃ij refers to the last offer of firm j (or to its first-stage offer if it did not raise it
during the bargaining game).
2. For a firm j, play I iff ˜̃Pij + ε < P
max
ij and
βi × Zij∗i + θibi(
˜̃Pij∗i ) + ρi(
˜̃Pij∗i ) < maxk 6=j∗i
{
βi × Zik + θibi( ˜̃Pik) + ρi( ˜̃Pik)
}
,
where ˜̃Pik refers to the standing offer of firm k (or to its first-stage offer when we are
in the initial round of the bargaining game).
5 Identification and Estimation
In this section, we study the identification of the model parameters, which include the
conditional distribution of bequest preferences Fθ(·|S), the distribution of preferences for
risk ratings Fβ(·), the distribution of costs Wr(·|S), and the channel- and savings-specific
information processing cost α. We observe outcomes of the annuity process described above
for N retirees who choose one of the several annuity products, where N is large.
For each retiree i ∈ N , we observe her socioeconomic characteristics Xi = (X̃i, Si), her
consideration set Ai, which is the list of annuity products that she solicits offers for, the
set of firms J̃i who could participate, the set of participating firms Ji ≥ 2, their risk ratings
{Zj ∈ R : j = 1, . . . , Ji} and their pension offers each product and the implied discounted
expected utilities ρia := (ρ1a, . . . , ρJia) for all a ∈ Ai. For each offer, we can determine the
corresponding bequest, if any. So, for each a ∈ Ai, we also observe the implied discounted
expected utilities from bequest bia := (b1a, . . . , bJia).
Let D1i ∈ {1, . . . , J + 1} denote i’s choice in the first stage, such that D1i = j means i
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chose firm j, and D1i = (J + 1) means i chose to go to the second round. Conditional on
D1i = (J + 1), we also observe j’s final choice and the chosen company’s identity.
5.1 Distribution of Bequest Preference
Here we study the identification of the distribution of the preference for bequest Fθ(·|S)
with support [0, θ]. To this end, we rely on the fact that we observe her final choice for each
retiree, which means we know her chosen bequest. Comparing the chosen bequest and the
foregone bequests, we can identify her bequest preference. In this exercise, we use only the
winning firms’ offers to “control” for the effect of risk-rating on choices.
For intuition, let’s consider the case where the consideration sets have only two annuity
products, where product 1 offers a smaller bequest–and larger pensions–than product 2. Let
a ∈ {1, 2} denote the two products. Using (4), we can write the utility from product a as
Uij∗i a = β
>
i Zij∗i + ρij∗i a + θi × bij∗i a − U0i(Si),
where j∗i ∈ Ji is the firm chosen by retiree i. Let χi ∈ {1, 2} denote i’s choice a = 1 or
a = 2. Suppressing the index for retiree and winning firm, χ = 1 if and only if U1 ≥ U2, or
equivalently θ ≤ ρ1−ρ2
b2−b1 . Then the probability that a retiree with characteristics X chooses
the annuity with the smallest bequest is




∣∣∣S) = Fθ|S (−∆ρ12
∆b12
∣∣∣S) .






. So if there is sufficient variation in X̃ across retirees, and
sufficient variation in the indifference ratios across retirees and firms, we can “trace” Fθ(·|S)
everywhere over [0, θ]. Formally, if for t ∈ [0, θ] there is a pair {∆ρ12,∆b21} in the data such
that t = −∆ρ12/∆b12, then the distribution is nonparametrically identified.
If there are more than two products in the consideration set, i.e., A ≥ 2, then we can
order them from that with the lowest bequest to the highest bequest, the probability that a
retiree with X chooses the annuity with lowest bequest is given by
Pr(χ = 1|X̃, S) =
∫
Θ








Similarly, the probability of not choosing the annuity with the largest bequest is given by
Pr(χ 6= |A|







So, we can use these two equations to identify Fθ(·|S), where, as mentioned above, the iden-
tifying source of variation are, X̃, annuitization costs across firms, number of participating
firms, which in turn lead to variations will induce variation in pensions and bequests.
5.2 Information Processing Cost
Here, we verify that we can identify the channel- and savings-specific information processing
cost. Let J denote the unique values of Ji across all i ∈ N . Consider the subset of retirees
with |Ji| = J . Then, we can identify the conditional choice probability for j ∈ (J + 1),




1[D1i = j,Xi = x, Z = z,ρ,b]∑
i 1[Xi = x, Z = z,ρ,b]




Applying (10) to the relevant subsample, we can identify {σj(x, z,ρ,b|J)}j∈J for all J ∈
J . We can also identify the probability that there are J participating firms as p(J) =
#{retirees with Ji = J}/N , and together we identify σj(x, z,ρ,b) =
∑
J∈J σj(x, z,ρ,b|J)×
p(J). Integrating (5) with respect to Fβ and using the definition of σ̂j(x, z,ρ,b) gives
σ̂j(x, z,ρ,b) =
















Thus, the information processing cost depends on the choice probability elasticity with




≈ 0, then it implies that α ≈ +∞ because the only way to rationalize
the fact that retirees do not respond to changes in pension is that their information processing
cost is extremely large. If the demand is elastic with respect to the pensions, then the cost
of processing information is low, and vice versa. To identify the cost as a function of the
channel and savings, we can use the appropriate subsample and follow the above steps.
5.3 Risk-Rating Preferences and Annuitization Costs
To identify the preference distribution Fβ and the cost distribution Wr, it is sufficient to
consider only those who buy annuities in the second round, where the chosen pension and
21To estimate α, we use a logit specification to model the LHS of (11) so the derivatives are well defined.
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Figure 5: Histogram of Winner and Runner Up
Note: The histogram shows the identity of the winning firms (on the x-axis) and the runner-up firms (on
the y-axis). The runner-up firm for a retiree is the firm that has the largest probability of being chosen by
the retiree after excluding the chosen firm, where the probabilities are estimated using logistic regression as
explained in Appendix A.2.
bequests are given by (9). Let P̃ij∗i be the chosen offer. Then from (9) P̃ij∗i satisfies
ρi(P̃ij∗i ) + θibi(P̃ij∗i ) = maxk 6=j∗i
{
βi × Zik + θibi(Pmaxik ) + ρi(Pmaxik )
}
− βi × Zij∗i . (12)
Let k∗i denote the runner-up company in i’s auction. Then we can re-write (12) as














≡ βi × (Zik∗i − Zij∗i ) +$i, (13)
where the first equality follows from (3), and $ ∼ F$ is the highest gross utility that the run-
ner up firm k∗i can offer to retiree i. Notice that we can use the chosen annuity to determine
the left-hand side terms, and if we view $ as an error, then (13) is the random coefficient
model. From the literature on random coefficient (Hoderlein, Klemelä, and Mammen, 2010),
we know that the distributions Fβ and F$ are nonparametrically identified under our main-
tained assumption that (Zik∗i − Zij∗i ) and βi and $i are uncorrelated and there is sufficient
variation in (Zik∗i − Zij∗i ). The runner-up and the winner firm pairs vary across retirees,
which ensures the difference (Zik∗i − Zij∗i ) also varies as can be seen in Figure 5.
The next step is to show that we can determine Wr(·) from {Fβ, Fθ}. The argument
is based on the following steps. First, note that for each draw θi ∼ Fθ, the distribution
of the LHS in (13) is also the distribution of the second largest value of the RHS in (13).
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Second, from this distribution of the order statistics, we can identify the parent distribution
of the RHS in (13). Third, this parent distribution is a convolution of the distribution of
βi × (Zik∗i − Zij∗i ) and the distribution of $i, which in turn identifies the distribution of




pension runner-up firm k∗i can offer to retiree i, see Equation (A.7), which together with









formalize these steps in the following result, and provide the proof in Appendix A.3.
Lemma 2. Wr(·|S) can be nonparametrically identified from {Fβ, Fθ}.
Selective Entry. Let J̃ be the set of companies that are interested in selling annuities
to i with characteristics Xi. When i requests an offer for a product, company j ∈ J̃ observes
its cost rj, and all firms simultaneously decide whether or not to participate, and it costs
(the same) κ ≥ 0 for each company to participate. This cost captures the opportunity cost
to participate, and it can vary across retirees. Let J ⊂ J̃ denote the set of participating
companies. All the firms that participate simultaneously make their offers.
Under the symmetric Perfect Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, the entry decision is character-
ized by a unique threshold r∗ ∈ [r, r] such that firms participate only if their costs are less
than r∗. Then the cost distribution among the participating firms is W ∗r (r; J̃) := Wr(r|r ≤
r∗; J̃) = Wr(r)/Wr(r
∗; J̃). Let r∗
J̃
be the threshold with J̃ potential bidders, and suppose
J̃ ∈ J := {J, . . . , J}, where J is the maximum number of potential bidders and J is the
smallest number of potential bidders. All else equal, r∗
J̃
decreases with J̃ , so Wr(r) is iden-
tified on the support [r, r∗J ].
5.4 Estimation Steps for Risk-Rating Preference and Annuitiza-
tion Cost Distribution
Here, we present the steps that we take to estimate the conditional distributions of β and
r. Although we can nonparametrically identify Fβ(·|X), we impose parametric assumption
about the density for estimation. In particular, we divide retirees into separate groups based
on gender, three age groups and savings quintiles, and three channels, which gives us a total of
G = 90 groups, and further assume that βi in (13) is normally distributed, βi ∼ N (βg(i), σg(i))
where g(i) ∈ G is i’s group. Thus, we allow each group to have a group-specific mean and
variance of β. Similarly, we assume that savings affect r through the savings quintiles Sq,
i.e. r ∼ Wr(·|Sq), where Sq is the q ∈ {1, . . . , 5} quintile of savings.
Let Nq,J denote the subset of retirees in the q
th−quintile and have J ∈ {13, 14, 15}
potential bidders. Then, we can re-write our estimation equation (13) with group-specific
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coefficients for each (q, J) ∈ {1, . . . , 5} × {13, 14, 15} pair as
ρj∗i + θi × bj∗i = βg(i) × (Zk∗i − Zj∗i ) +$k∗i ; i = 1, 2, . . . , Nq,J , (14)
and βg = β0 + υg where E(υg) = 0 and E(υ2g) < ∞. Applying GLS to equation (14), we
estimate group-specific βg and $k∗i for all i ∈ Nq,J .
Next, using the estimated F̂θ(·|Sq), we can “integrate-out” θ from the estimation equation.
For each (q, J) and each i ∈ Ng, we generate i.i.d. samples {θi,`}|Ng(i)|i=1 ∼ F̂θ(·|Sq), and
estimate {β̂`g : g = 1, . . . , G} applying generalized least squared method to
ρj∗i + θ
`




We repeat this exercise for L = 10, 000 sample draws of θ, which, for each group g ∈ G gives





To estimate Wr(·|Sq), we focus on the sub-sample of retirees that have the top two firms
with the same risk ratings. In our sample, close to 60,000 retirees are in this group and have







where the left hand is the known winning utility and the right-hand side is the unobserved
maximum utility the runner-up firm can offer without incurring loss. Thus, the estimation
problem in (16) becomes similar to the estimation problem in a standard English auction
where only the winning bid is observed. The key difference here is that everything is expressed
in terms of winning utility and not the bid. From the estimated distribution of (ρj∗i +θ
`
ibj∗i ), we
can estimate the parent distribution of r̂ij, i.e., W
∗
r (·|Sq, J) using a Kernel Density Estimator.
6 Estimation Results
Preferences for Bequests. In Figure 6, we display the estimates of the conditional dis-
tributions of preferences for bequests, given savings quintiles {F̂θ(·|Sq), q = 1, . . . , 5}. Our
estimates suggest that approximately 40% of retirees do not value leaving bequests, so there
is a positive mass at θ = 0. In Table 11, we present some summary statistics associated
with these conditional distributions. As we can see, the median θ is either 0 or very close to
0, but the average θ is around 2. We also find considerable heterogeneity, both within and
across different savings quintiles, as shown by the last two columns in Table 11.22
22Kopczuk and Lupton (2007) provides an excellent discussion about variation in bequest preference.
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Figure 6: Estimated Distributions of Bequest Preferences



















Note: This figure displays estimated conditional distribution of preference for bequests Fθ(·|Sq) given savings
quintile Sq, q = 1, . . . , 5, as we move from the left to the right.
The fact that the conditional distributions in Figure 6 “shift right” with saving quintile
suggests that the average bequest preference increases with savings. We can also see this
pattern by comparing E(θ|Sq) across savings quintiles in Table 11. This result is consistent
with the hypothesis that with decreasing marginal utility from a pension, the marginal utility
of bequest for an altruist retiree increases with savings. From Table 11, we also see that
although the mean of θ suggests that, at the margin, retirees value bequest twice as much
as they value self-consumption, the median is almost zero.
Table 11: Summary Statistics of Preference for Bequests
Savings Mean Median Std. Dev. IQR
Q1 1.92 0 2.82 3.34
Q2 2.22 0.1 3.22 3.77
Q3 2.25 0 3.27 3.85
Q4 2.41 0 3.5 4.13
Q5 2.82 0.35 3.82 5.01
Note: Mean, median, standard deviation and inter-quartile range of preference for bequests, by saving
quintiles. These statistics are calculated using simulated θ from {F̂θ(·|Sq)}5q=1 as shown in Figure 6.
Risk ratings and Information Processing Costs. Next, we present the estimates
of the preference for risk-rating. Figure 7 displays the group-specific means of β, with their
corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The estimates of β suggest that those in the lowest
two savings quintiles are the only ones who value firms’ risk ratings. Moreover, even among
these retirees, males have a stronger preference for risk ratings than females.
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Figure 7: Group-Specific Mean of Preferences for Risk Ratings

























Note: These figures display the estimates for group-specific mean of E(βg), from (13). Each panel (row)
corresponds to a channel, and each channel is divided into five quintiles. And within each channel-quintile
box, parameters are ordered by retirement age (before, after or at NRA), and for each age group, the two
estimates correspond to male and a female respectively. The two bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
On the face of it, the fact that preference for risk ratings decreases with savings is counter-
intuitive. There are at last two reasons why it is so. First, if the risk-rating is a proxy for
financial health, then there should be no heterogeneity across retirees. Second, because of
the government’s guarantee, those with higher savings are more exposed to the “bankruptcy
risk” than those with lower savings, so the high savers should care more about the risk
ratings than the low savers. One way to explain this finding is to consider the information
processing cost. If these groups have different information processing costs, then the rational-
inattention model suggests that the group with lower-cost processes more information and
learns more.
In Table 12, we present the estimated group-specific information processing costs (α̂g).
We find that the cost decreases with savings, and the absolute decrease is largest among the
retirees with the lowest quintile and who have sales agents because those with higher savings
tend to be more educated. So, even if the prior suggests that the risk ratings are essential,
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those with lower information processing cost revise their preferences downwards to reflect
that bankruptcy is a rare event in Chile and that most of the firms have good ratings.
Table 12: Information Processing Cost
Savings AFP Sales Agent Advisor Full Sample
Q1 0.009 0.027 0.006 0.021
Q2 0.006 0.019 0.004 0.016
Q3 0.005 0.013 0.003 0.013
Q4 0.005 0.012 0.003 0.005
Q5 0.005 0.012 0.003 0.006
Overall 0.005 0.013 0.003 0.009
Note: Estimates of the median of information processing cost, by savings quintiles and intermediary channel.
Annuitization Costs. Figure 8i presents the estimates of the conditional distributions
of costs given the savings quintile. Recall that rij := UNCj/UNCi is the ratio of firm j’s
UNC to retiree i’s UNC and is thus unit free.23 So, rij > 1 means that firm j’s cost of
annuitizing i’s savings is larger than an actuarially fair cost, and vice-versa.
Figure 8: Conditional Distributions of Annuitization Costs























(i) Over the Full Support





















(ii) Focusing on r < 1.
Note: The first sub-figure shows the estimated conditional distribution of relative annuitization costs, by
savings quintiles. The second figure shows the same distributions but focuses only on the support r < 1.
As we can see from Figure 8i, because the distributions “shift right” with savings, it
suggests that the annuitization cost also increases with savings. In Table 13, we present the
summary statistics of r by savings quintiles, and we can see that the mean annuitization
costs do not seem to increase with savings quintiles. This finding is at odds with the prior
23Recall that we work with rij instead of UNCj because each retiree is unique and has different mortality
and normalizing UNCj by UNCi homogenizes cost across retirees. Then we can “pool” the data from
different retiree auctions together and make inter-retiree comparisons.
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research finding that wealth rankings are essential determinants of mortality, conditional on
the initial health status.
The shapes of the distributions when r < 1 (see Figure 8ii) can explain this pattern.
Firms are twice as likely (14% versus 6%) to have r < 1 when the retiree belongs to the
top two savings quintiles than when they do not. Thus, this “crossing” of the conditional
distribution functions lowers the overall average costs for high savers.
Table 13: Summary Statistics of r
Savings Mean Median Std. Dev. IQR
Q1 2.74 3.1 1.47 2.7
Q2 2.75 3.11 1.47 2.7
Q3 2.73 3.07 1.46 2.69
Q4 2.77 3.12 1.47 2.69
Q5 2.76 3.12 1.48 2.72
Note: The table displays mean, median, standard deviation and inter-quartile range of the annuitization
costs r. These statistics are calculated using simulated r from {Ŵr(·|Sq)}5q=1 as shown in Figure 8i.
In equilibrium, pensions are determined by the lowest two order-statistics of the cost,
which in turn depends on the left tail of the distributions (Figure 8ii). So, the fact that firms
are twice as likely to have r < 1 for the highest two quintiles than the other three quintiles
translates into a larger gap between what firms offer and their break-even offer. The best
way to illustrate this is to use the estimated cost distributions and determine the maximum
pension that firms can offer without making a loss.
To this end, we run the following simulation exercise: (i) for each savings quintile, we
identify the retiree with the median income (among this subsample); (ii) simulate {r(`) : ` =
1, . . . , 1000}’s from the relevant distribution Ŵr(·|·); (ii) using the savings and the estimated
UNCi of the retiree identified in step (i), for each draw r
(`) determine UNCj and from that
the maximum pension is is given by the zero-profit condition, i.e., Pij = Si/UNCj. Figure
9 shows the resulting distributions of these pensions. Furthermore, we can see, those firms
would offer more for those with higher savings than with lower savings per dollar.
7 Counterfactual Results
Based on these results, we consider ways to improve the market, some of which are also
under debate in the Chilean parliament: (1) simplify the current system by replacing it
with the standard English auction; (2) remove risk ratings from the supply side to increase
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Figure 9: Distributions of Maximum Pension Pmax
















Note: Conditional distributions of maximum pensions for retiree with median savings within each quintile.
For each savings quintile 1 ≤ q ≤ 5, we simulate several rs from Ŵr(·|Sq) that is displayed in Figure 8i, and
we determine the median savings among this group. Using these rs and the median saving, we determine the
maximum pensions Pmax that firms can offer without making loss and estimate the distribution of Pmax.
competition by selecting the firm that pays the highest pension, and (3) automate the system,
so retirees do not use risk ratings to choose a firm.
We present pensions and retirees’ gross utility under the current system, full information,
and English auction. However, first, we determine the pensions and utilities under first-best
full information outcomes, i.e., when firms’ annuitization costs are publicly known, and the
winning firm offers the break-even pensions. First-best outcomes allow us to compare results
across different mechanisms, they are interesting per se because we can use them to quantify
the effect of asymmetric information on pensions and retirees’ utilities.
7.1 Complete Information
We begin by considering the effect of asymmetric information on the pension and the margin
and how that varies across different savings quintiles and competition. To determine the
pensions under full information, we divide retirees into 15 groups based on their savings
quintiles and their corresponding potential number of bidders. Then, for each retiree in a
group, we simulate as many r from the appropriate Ŵr(·|Sq) as the potential number of
bidders present and determine the lowest cost among those draws. The winner will be the
bidder with the lowest cost. Then, we determine the zero-profit pension the winning firm can
offer. For every retiree, we repeat this step 10,000 times and calculate the average pension.
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Figure 10: Estimated Distributions of Pensions (in 1000s of US$)














































































Note: Distributions of pensions (in thousands of U.S. dollars) under the current system (solid blue), under
English auction (dashed blue) and under full information (dotted red), by savings quintiles (rows) and the
number of potential bidders (columns). The sample includes only those who choose in the second round.
In Figure 10, we present the distributions of chosen pensions (in solid blue line) and the
pension if there was no private information about r (in the dotted red line). As expected,
the pension distribution under full information, first-order stochastically dominates the dis-
tribution of the observed pensions. Interestingly, the gap between the two distributions is
substantial for those with higher savings, suggesting that firms have a more considerable
margin from this group.
In Table 14, we present the mean and median of current pensions as a percentage of the
full information pensions for each group. We find that for the lowest three savings quintiles,
the numbers are at least 85%, whereas for the top-two saving quintiles, they are significantly
lower. These results are consistent with the shape of the cost distributions, as shown in
Figure 10.
Next, we also consider the money’s worth ratio for each group. Money’s worth ratio
measures the generosity of an annuity contract, see Mitchell et al. (1999). As we have
explained earlier in Section 3, the money’s worth ratio is the return a retiree can expect to
earn per annuitized dollar. Suppose this ratio is more than (respectively, less than) one. In
37
Table 14: Pensions under Current and English auctions, relative to Full Info.




































Note: Mean and median of pensions under the current system and under English auction, expressed as a
percentage of the pension under full information, separated by savings quintile (rows) and the number of
potential bidders (columns). Each entry has two rows: The first row corresponds to the current system and
the second row corresponds to the English auction.
that case, a retiree expects to earn more than (respectively, less than) what she annuitizes.24
Instead of presenting money’s worth ratios for each retiree, in Table 15, we present the
group-specific money’s worth ratios, which are equal to the ratio (
∑
i Pi × UNCi)/
∑
i Si,
where the sum is over all retirees in the respective group. As we can see from the first
column, those with AFP (the first row within each quintile) get better money’s worth ratio
than the other two channels under the current system. We also see that those with higher
savings get a slightly better offer than those with lower savings. If we compare the first and
the last columns in Table 15, we see that as before, the gap between the current system and
that under the full information is the largest for those with higher savings.
7.2 English Auction
One way to increase pensions is to make the system more competitive. To this end, we can
replace the current system with the standard English auction, and also “shut down” the risk
ratings in the supply side by picking the winner to be the firm that offers the highest pension.
Simplifying the process should improve outcomes for those who choose in the first round.
Similarly, shutting down risk-rating should force firms to bid more aggressively; the benefits
should be larger for lower savers than higher savers. The former have stronger preferences
for risk ratings, which means without risk ratings, the firms should be more aggressive if the
retiree is of lower savings. However, because the gap between the chosen pension and the
full information pension is the largest for those with higher savings, they may benefit the
24Formally, the money’s worth ratio for i, under the current system, is equal to i’s chosen pension times
her UNCi divided by her savings Si.
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Table 15: Money’s Worth Ratio, by Savings Quintile and Channel
Savings Quintile Channel Current English Full Info.
Q1 AFP 0.99018 0.93229 1.04419
Sales Agent 0.95663 0.93128 1.04327
Advisor 0.95969 0.93019 1.04237
Q2 AFP 1.02480 0.95833 1.04920
Sales Agent 0.99589 0.95728 1.04841
Advisor 0.99624 0.95608 1.04748
Q3 AFP 1.04418 0.96340 1.08998
Sales Agent 1.02315 0.96216 1.08906
Advisor 1.01623 0.96067 1.08796
Q4 AFP 1.06109 1.13492 1.86677
Sales Agent 1.04144 1.13166 1.86129
Advisor 1.03278 1.12759 1.85429
Q5 AFP 1.09793 1.12368 1.87748
Sales Agent 1.07350 1.12027 1.87109
Advisor 1.06609 1.11688 1.86514





i Si, where the sum is taken over all retirees in the group. There are 15 groups
based on 5 savings quintiles and 3 channels. Each column corresponds to a different pricing mechanism,
where English is the English auction.
most from the new mechanism.
Next, we implement the standard English auction by treating the potential bidders as the
actual bidders. Our results are an upper bound on the effect of English auction on pensions
and retirees’ ex-post expected present discounted gross utilities. We follow the same steps as
in the full information counterfactual, except under the English auction, the winning pension
is the maximum pension a firm with the second-lowest-cost (r) can offer, at zero profit.
We present the Kernel density estimates of the distributions of winning pensions under
English auction in Figure 10. Although English auction leads to higher pensions, most of the
benefits accrue to those in the top two savings quintiles. We can also see this in the second
row of Table 14 for each quintile, where we present the mean and the median pension under
English auction expressed as a percentage of the pension under full information. Similar
results hold if we consider the money’s worth ratio; see the first two columns in Table 15.
We are also interested in determining the effect of using the English auction on retirees’
ex-post utilities. We do not know the utility from the outside option, but we can determine
the ex-post gross expected discounted present utility which is equal to βi × Zj + ρij + θibij.
For each retiree and each mechanism using the “winning” pensions, we first determine
the bequest (if any) and then calculate the ex-post expected present discounted utilities.
To shed light on the effect of shutting down risk ratings on the retirees’ utilities, for each
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mechanism, we calculate two utilities: one with βi×Zj and one without Zj by setting βi = 0.
To calculate the utility from the risk-rating, we use simulated data under the assumption
that βi is normal with estimated group-specific mean and variance.
We present the average utilities across different groups in Tables 16 and 17. In Table 16,
we group retirees by their savings quintiles and the potential number of bidders and in Table
17 we group retirees by their savings quintiles and their channels. In each table, and for each
mechanism, we have two columns, one with and one without (asterisk) β, respectively.
Note that for each quintile in Table 16, by comparing the rows, we can see that the
utilities increase with the number of bidders because the pensions increase when there are
more firms. However, despite the large gap between the pensions under the current system
or the pensions under English auction and the pension under the full information (Figure
10), our estimates show that the gap in utilities is almost negligible.
From Table 17 we can see that similar results hold even if we group retirees by their
savings quintile and their channel. Nonetheless, what is new and here is that those who have
sale agents (second row in each savings quintile) have higher utilities than other channels,
and this difference decreases with savings.25
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop an empirical framework to study an imperfectly competitive market
for annuities. We used a rich administrative data set from the Chilean annuity market to
estimate our model. In the market, risk-averse retirees use first-price-auction-followed-by-
bargaining to select from different types of annuity contracts and a firm. Life insurance
companies have private information about their annuitization costs, and for each retiree
auction, they decide whether to participate and compete by making pension offers. The
Chilean data gives us a unique opportunity to examine the role of private information about
cost, retiree’s preferences, and market structure on the outcomes of a market for annuities.
Our main contribution is to study the current market system by estimating both the
demand and supply of annuities and evaluating a simpler mechanism that may improve the
system. We find that while there is a gap between the observed pensions under the current
system and pensions under the full information regime, the gap is significantly larger for
those with higher savings. We also determine the effect of replacing the current system
with a simpler one-shot English auction, where the winning firm offers the highest pension
on pensions and ex-post expected present discounted utilities. We find that while the new
25Adding an optimal reserve price has an insignificant effect on the outcomes. Results are available from
the authors upon request.
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Table 16: Average Gross Utility, by Savings Quintile and Potential Bidders
Bidders Current English Full Info. Current* English* Full Info.*
13 8.8176 8.8180 8.8191 -0.0054 -0.0049 -0.0039
14 6.9852 6.9851 6.9866 -0.0073 -0.0073 -0.0058
15 11.9204 11.9200 11.9215 -0.0073 -0.0077 -0.0061
13 3.5616 3.5618 3.5622 -0.0027 -0.0026 -0.0021
14 3.5055 3.5054 3.5061 -0.0038 -0.0040 -0.0033
15 4.2757 4.2753 4.2760 -0.0042 -0.0046 -0.0039
13 2.5903 2.5903 2.5907 -0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0011
14 2.6788 2.6787 2.6791 -0.0018 -0.0020 -0.0015
15 2.8087 2.8084 2.8089 -0.0021 -0.0024 -0.0018
13 2.4089 2.4091 2.4095 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0002
14 2.4462 2.4464 2.4468 -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0003
15 2.4724 2.4726 2.4731 -0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0003
13 2.3357 2.3358 2.3359 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0001
14 2.2684 2.2684 2.2686 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0001
15 2.3018 2.3019 2.3021 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0001
Note: The table displays the gross utility, see Equation (4), under 4 (current, English auction, and full
information) pricing mechanisms, averaged over subgroups defined by savings quintile and potential bidders.
Each quintile is separated by a horizontal line, and within each line, the rows reflect the number of potential
bidders {13, 14, 15}. The first four columns use the estimated β (c.f. Figure 7) in calculating the utility and
the last four columns (with asterisk) set β = 0 in (4).
mechanism increases pensions for almost every retiree, pensions increase the most for those
in the top two savings quintiles, albeit the increase in utility is minimal.
There are several possible avenues for future research on related topics. First, we can
also include the choice between PW and annuities and consider an imperfectly competitive
market with two-sided asymmetric information. On the demand side, retirees will have
private information about their mortality forces and their bequest preferences. On the
supply side, as in our case, firms have private information about their annuitization costs.
Another interesting extension of our model is to allow for the possibility that bargaining in
the second round is costly for some retirees. Introducing such a cost would require us to
embed search friction into the second stage, but it might provide us with a complete picture
of the market.
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Table 17: Average Gross Utility, by Savings Quintile and Channel
Channel Current English Full Info. Current* English* Full Info.*
AFP 9.2078 9.2073 9.2087 -0.0066 -0.0071 -0.0057
Sales Agent 11.7779 11.7778 11.7794 -0.0075 -0.0075 -0.006
Advisor 9.239 9.2388 9.2402 -0.0068 -0.0069 -0.0055
AFP 3.7995 3.799 3.7998 -0.0038 -0.0043 -0.0036
Sales Agent 4.4095 4.4092 4.4099 -0.0041 -0.0043 -0.0036
Advisor 3.585 3.5848 3.5854 -0.0038 -0.004 -0.0033
AFP 2.6741 2.6738 2.6743 -0.0019 -0.0022 -0.0017
Sales Agent 2.9609 2.9607 2.9611 -0.002 -0.0022 -0.0017
Advisor 2.5351 2.535 2.5354 -0.0019 -0.0021 -0.0016
AFP 2.4637 2.4639 2.4644 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0003
Sales Agent 2.5845 2.5847 2.5852 -0.001 -0.0008 -0.0003
Advisor 2.2824 2.2826 2.283 -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0003
AFP 2.3075 2.3076 2.3078 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0001
Sales Agent 2.3537 2.3537 2.354 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0001
Advisor 2.2215 2.2216 2.2218 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0001
Note: The table displays the gross utility, see equation (4), under four (current, English auction, and full
information) pricing mechanisms, averaged over subgroups defined by savings quintile and the three channels:
AFP, sales agents and advisors. The first four columns use the estimated β (Figure 7) to calculate the utility
and the last four columns (with asterisk) set β = 0 in (4).
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Appendix
A.1 Expected Discounted Present Utilities
Here we explain how we determine the discounted expected utility given by Equation (3).
To provide intuition, while keeping the notations manageable we only explain a simple case
where the mortalities are known and common across all individuals. Once we understand
this simpler case, it is straightforward to allow for individual specific longevity prospects but
notationally messy, and for brevity, we do not describe that case here.
The major difficulty in determining Equation 3 is the fact that unlike a pension which
is fixed, bequest (the wealth left for her estate) varies over time and across retirees. In
particular, it depends on having legal beneficiaries, the type of annuity (in particular, whether
it has a guaranteed period), and the time of death (before or after the guaranteed period).
Chilean law states that certain individuals are eligible to receive survivorship benefits upon
the death of a retiree. As mentioned in Section 3, we focus on retirees without eligible
children (but with or without spouses), which is the most common case in our sample. The
spouse is eligible for a survivorship annuity equivalent to 60% of the retiree’s original pension.
When the annuity includes a guaranteed period (of G months), and the annuitant dies
before G, say in G′ < G months, her spouse will continue to get the same pension for the
next (G − G′) months and after that he gets 60% of the original pension. If at the time of
death there is no surviving spouse (either because the retiree was single when contracting
the annuity or because the spouse died before the retiree), the 100% is paid to the designated
beneficiaries in the annuity contract. We assume that the retiree values her spouse or other
beneficiaries in the same way, with utility v(Bit). Using these rules we can write Equation
(3) as











× v(0.6× P )
)













= u(P )×DRi + θi ×
(





where q∗it is the probability that the spouse will be alive in t.
Next, we explain how to calculate the net present expected value (NPEV) of an annuity
(ρij, bij) from pension offer Pij in Equation (3). For this, we model the force of mortality as
a continuous random variable distributed as Gompertz distribution. Let t0 denote the age
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at retirement, expressed in months and let δ ∈ (0, 1) denote the discount factor. An annuity
pays a constant benefit P from t0 until retiree’s death, so NPEV is calculated at t0. We start
by considering immediate annuity with no spouse. Such annuity does not pay anything to
the beneficiaries upon death, therefore, bij = 0.
Let Fm(t|X) be the conditional distribution function for the time of death of retiree with
characteristics X, and let fm(t|X) be the corresponding conditional density. For notational
simplicity, we suppress the dependence on X. The probability of being alive at time t,
i.e., that death occurs after t, is given by the survivor function Fm(t) := 1 − Fm(t). Since
the analysis is from the perspective of a retiree who is alive at t0, henceforth, all relevant




u(P )Fm(t|t > t0)e−δ(t−t0)dt. (A.2)
As introduced in Section 3.1.3, we assume that Fm is a Gompertz distribution, so the con-
ditional survival functions as Fm(t | t > t0;λ, g) = e−
λ
g
(egt−egt0 ). Substituting this in (A.2)
gives



















and estimate the parameters (g, τ) using maximum likelihood method. Finally, we set the
discount factor δ = ln(1 + r̃t0), where r̃t0 is the annual market rate of return at t0.
Deferred Annuity. If the annuity contracts include a deferred period clause for d
months, then the pensions start from t0+d. In the meantime, the retiree receives a “temporal
payment,” which is almost always twice the pension. The annuity component of the NPEV
expression in (A.3) remains the same, except the lower limit is t0 +d and an additional term
reflecting the temporal payment to be received during the transitory period:



























Annuity with Guaranteed Periods. In addition to deferment, annuity contracts can
also have a guaranteed period clause, which implies that if the retiree dies within a certain
period (denoted as g months) from the start of the payment (either t0 or t1 = t0 + d), the
total pension amount (P ) will be paid to the retiree’s spouse or other beneficiaries specified
in the contract until the end of the guaranteed period. The NPEV of benefits to be received
by the retiree is the same as (A.3) if d = 0 and (A.4) if d > 0. As the retiree’s beneficiaries
are now eligible for benefits in the event of death within the guaranteed period, we let b as
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the NPEV of benefits to be received by these beneficiaries, i.e., bequests. Recall that the
instantaneous utility associated with beneficiaries receiving a pension P is given by θ× v(·).
The bequest b, assuming a deferment period until t0 + d and a guaranteed period of g is
similar to (A.2), except that the upper integration limit is given by the guaranteed period
and the instantaneous probability function corresponds to Fm(t | t > t0;λ, g):
b = θ × v(P )×
{∫ t1+g
t1
Fm(t|t > t0;λ, g)e−δ(t−t0)dt
}









Allowing for Eligible Spouse. When a participant is married at the time of retirement,
the spouse is eligible for a survivorship benefit in the case he or she outlives the retiree. This
benefit is until death and, in the absence of eligible children, equivalent to 60% of the
original pension benefit. Once again, the formula for the NPEV associated with benefits to
be received by the retiree (ρ) is not affected by the presence of spouse (except for the fact
that the offered pension will be lower, to account for the additional contractual entitlements).
The formula for the NPEV of bequest must then include an additional term, to account
for the additional benefits to be paid in the case the spouse outlives the retiree, after the
guaranteed period has elapsed. We assume that the two mortality processes are independent
and follow the same Gompertz distribution (same g parameter, but different λsp parameter


























where ∆ is the age difference between the retiree and the retiree’s spouse.
A.1.1 Recovering Pension from Expected Present Value
In this section, we consider the reverse problem of determining pension P from ρ and b for
a retiree with bequest preference θ. This exercise is important because, if we can uniquely
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determine pension from the expected present value, then it will allow us to go back and
forth between the monetary value of an annuity (for the supply side) to utility for the retiree
(for the demand side). From (3) we know that w(P,B; θ) = ρ(P ) + θb(P ), and letting
$ = w(P,B; θ) we get
$ = u(P )×DR + u(2× P )×DR,DP + θ
(
















where the second equality follows from u(c) = v(c) = c
−2
−2 . Then we can solve for the pension
as
P =
√√√√(DR + DR,DP4 )+ θ (DS + DS,GP0.36 )
−2×$
. (A.7)
A.2 Determining the Runner-Up Firm
We define the runner-up firm in round one as the firm with the highest prob of being chosen
in the first round once we exclude the chosen firm. And under the assumption that the
runner-up in round one is one of the two most competitive firms in the second round then
we can identify the runner-up firm for the second round as well.
To construct a measure of the probability of being selected in the first round, we estimate a
series of alternative-specific conditional logit model. To allow for the most general estimation,
we divided the sample into 90 different groups, based on the age at retirement (below, at,
and above the NRA), gender, channel (recall that we combine insurance companies and
sales agents into one so there are three channels) and balance quintiles. For each group,
we estimate the model where the choice of an individual depends on firms’ characteristics
such as the ratio of reserves to assets, the fraction of sellers employed by each firm, the ratio
between the fraction of complaints and premium of each firm, and the risk rating and also




1 × Zjt + γ2 × mwrij + εijt, (A.8)
where γ0j is a company-specific constant, and γ
1 is a coefficient vector for firm-specific




. Using these estimated probabilities for a retiree i, we say that a company
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j is the runner-up if j provides the highest utility to individual i among the set of companies
ultimately not chosen by i.
A.3 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. Note first that, given the proposed strategies, as ε goes to zero, the winner is the firm
with the maximum ρi(P
max
ij ) + θi × bi(Pmaxij ) + βi × Zij. We introduce some notation and
then check that the proposed strategies are optimal for any ε > 0:
• Given a history H, let ˜̃Pi be the vector of standing offers.





θi × bi(Pmaxij ) + βi × Zij
}
; and let µj(H) ≡ Pr(E1).
• Given a history H at which j plays and player k is winning (it could be the case
that j = k), let E2 be the event that ˜̃Pil + ε > Pmaxil for all l 6= j and l 6= k. Let
µ̃j(H) ≡ Pr(E2) and ˜̃µj(H) ≡ Pr(E1 ∧ E2).
• Given H and conditional on E1, define P ∗ji as the expected value of P such that
βi × Zij∗i + θi × bi(P ) + ρi(P ) = maxk 6=j
{
βi × Zik + θi × bi(Pmaxik ) + ρi(Pmaxik )
}
.
Note that P ∗ji ≤ Pmaxij .
• Given H and conditional on E1 ∧ ¬E2, define P̃ ∗ji as the expected value of P such that
βi × Zij∗i + θi × bi(P ) + ρi(P ) = maxk 6=j
{
βi × Zik + θi × bi(Pmaxik ) + ρi(Pmaxik )
}
.
Assume first H is such that j is not the current winner, then j’s expected payment from
choosing I is greater than the one from choosing S:
µj(H)× (Si − UNCj × P ∗ji) ≥ (1− µ̃j(H))× µj(H)× (Si − UNCj × P ∗ji).
Assume (H) is such that j is the current winner. Then j’s expected payoff of choosing Si is
µj(H)× (Si − UNCj × P ∗ji) = (µj(H)− ˜̃µj(H))× (Si − UNCj × P̃ ∗ji) + ˜̃µj(H)× (Si − UNCj ×
˜̃P ∗ji),
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which is greater than or equal the expected payment of choosing I, so that
(µj(H)− ˜̃µj(H))× (Si − UNCj × P̃ ∗ji) + ˜̃µj(H)× (Si − UNCj × (
˜̃P ∗ji + ε)).
Proof of Lemma 2.
Proof. For notational simplicity, we denote the LHS of Equation (13) as U and the RHS as
a sum β̃ + $. Consider auctions with J firms. From the observed chosen pensions and Fθ,
we can identify the distribution of U, which is, by definition, also the distribution of the




However, there is a one-to-one mapping between the distribution of order-statistics and the
“parent” distribution. In particular, the parent distribution of the sum Fβ̃+$(·) is pinned
down by FU(t) = F
(J−1:J)
β̃+$




And since Fβ̃+$ = Fβ̃ ∗F$, is a convolution, where ∗ is the convolution operator, we can
identify the distribution of $ via deconvolution. Lastly, we observe that there is a one-to-
one mapping from $ to Pmax –the maximum pension runner-up firm can offer to retiree (see
Equation A.7), which we denote by a function Pmax = m($) = S/UNCk. Then we get











































, (∵ Pmax = S/UNCk).
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